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I. INTRODUCTION 
From its rich landscape of beaches and rainforest, to its growth 
of coffee and other leading exports, and to its colorful culture por-
trayed in Carnival celebrations, Brazil appears to be an unstoppable 
force in both South America and the global community. However, 
due to recent events, Brazil has morphed into a nation crippled by 
scandal and political corruption.1 Such corruption has led to Brazil’s 
second presidential impeachment in the past 24 years.2 Brazil and 
the global community are left with feelings of political insecurity—
unsure if the impeachment of the highest-ranking figure in Brazil is 
a secure process that could give way to signs of growth for a nation 
that has already undergone numerous political transformations. 
Beginning with the Operation Car Wash scandal in March 
2014,3 in which dozens of Workers’ Party members were arrested, 
Brazilians’ extreme distrust of their own government has led to even 
greater political turmoil and economic decline for Brazil.4 On Au-
gust 31, 2016, Dilma Rousseff, the first female president of Brazil, 
was impeached on charges of having violated Brazilian budget 
laws.5 Arguably even more controversial, the Brazilian lawmaker 
who led the ousting  of Rousseff, Eduardo Cunha, has been over-
whelmingly voted out of Congress, convicted of corruption and 
money laundering, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.6 While 
it remains contestable whether Rousseff directly used the budget for 
her own personal benefit, it has become increasingly clear that she 
                                                                                                             
 1 Vanessa Buschschluter, Dilma Rousseff: Facing A Perfect Storm, BBC 
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35728133. 
 2 Marina Lopes & Dom Phillips, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff Ousted 




 3 Andrew Jacobs & Paula Moura, At the Birthplace of a Graft Scandal, Bra-
zil’s Crisis Is on Full Display, NY TIMES (June 10, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/06/11/world/americas/brazil-corruption-dilma-rousseff-opera-
tion-car-wash.html. 
 4 See Lopes & Phillips, supra note 2. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Simon Romero, Brazil’s Congress Expels Lawmaker Who Led Ouster 
of President, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09
/13/world/americas/eduardo-cunha-brazil-impeachment-dilma-
rousseff.html?_r=0. 
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may have used budget funds to aid her reelection.7 Rousseff’s for-
mer vice president and coalition partner Michel Temer has now re-
placed Rousseff.8 Within only a few months of taking the presi-
dency, Temer has already found himself in a scandal, as Brazil’s 
prosecutor general is investigating claims that he received millions 
of dollars in illicit payments and attempted to obstruct an anticor-
ruption drive.9 Thousands of Brazilians have demanded Temer’s 
resignation.10 With the recent impeachment of the most powerful 
political figure in Brazil, the question remains if Rousseff’s im-
peachment will turn the once thriving nation around and give it the 
opportunity to regain its political balance. 
This article will address the impeachment process in Brazil, re-
viewing relevant laws, constitutional provisions, and historical 
background in order to analyze how the impeachment process in 
Brazil functions and its impact on Brazilian governance. A compar-
ison will be made between the impeachment process in Brazil and 
the impeachment process of the United States, as much of Brazil’s 
First Republican Constitution was modeled after the United States 
Constitution. Part II of this article will discuss the historical back-
ground leading up to the current impeachment in Brazil and will 
identify times that Brazil has either impeached or threatened to im-
peach major political leaders. This section will include a detailed 
analysis of major constitutional provisions that affected the nation 
and address the political climate in Brazil leading to the impeach-
ment of Rousseff. Part III will analyze the Brazilian Constitution, 
                                                                                                             
 7 Joe Leahy, What is Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff accused of? Senators 
Declare Their Intention to Impeach Brazil’s President, FINANCIAL TIMES (May, 
12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/58401072-167d-11e6-b8d5-4c1fcdbe169f 
(“This creative accounting, known as ‘pedaladas’—Portuguese for pedaling—and 
roundly condemned by the TCU, the country’s budget watchdog, allegedly helped 
her win the 2014 elections by disguising the true state of the economy.”). 
 8 See Romero, supra note 6. 
 9 Simon Romero, Brazil’s President Assails His Accuser as Corruption 
Scandal Intensifies, NY TIMES (May 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/20/world/americas/michel-temer-brazil.html. 
 10 Id. (As of August 18, 2017, the President of the House of Deputies, Rodrigo 
Maia, has received 26 requests for impeachment of Temer; he has rejected one 
and is sitting on the other 25. One of the requests was made by the Brazilian Bar 
Association (OAB) on May 25, 2017. The OAB has also brought a writ of security 
action in the Supreme Court to try to compel Maia to act on his impeachment 
request). 
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specifically addressing how the Constitution mandates impeach-
ment processes to be carried out. This section will also discuss all 
relevant Brazilian laws regarding the impeachment process, namely 
Law No. 1079, enacted in 1950, which, in part, is inconsistent with 
the present constitutional impeachment provisions. Part IV will 
compare the Brazilian Constitution’s detailing of impeachment to 
that of the United States Constitution.  Brazil, unlike the United 
States, has had eight constitutions, and the present Constitution, 
adopted in 1988, has already had 101 amendments.  This section will 
discuss key differences in how Brazil handles impeachment pursu-
ant to its Constitution and discuss whether voting articles of im-
peachment has been an effective outlet of halting corruption. Part IV 
will analyze modern Brazilian impeachments, specifically Presi-
dents Collor de Mello and Rousseff, as well as modern U.S. im-
peachments, namely those of Nixon and Clinton. Finally, Part V will 
conclude with lessons that can be learned from the Brazilian im-
peachment process and will discuss whether this process has abated 
corruption in a meaningful and lasting way. Part V will additionally 
analyze whether the use of Brazil’s impeachment power has pro-
duced beneficial results for the nation and what Brazilian impeach-
ment has meant from a global perspective. Part VI will briefly con-
clude the article. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Transitional Period of Military Regime to Democratic Means 
From 1964 to 1985, Brazil was governed by an authoritarian 
military dictatorship.11 The 1964 military regime in Brazil was fully 
supported by the United States in hopes of deterring Brazil from 
                                                                                                             
 11 See Timeline Brazil, BBC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1231075.stm; see generally Thomas E. Skid-
more, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985, (Oxford U. Press, 
(1988)). 
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slipping towards a communist regime.12 Due to widespread opposi-
tion to the military regime,13 this period was one of continual con-
stitutional crisis.  In response, the government issued a series of 17 
Institutional Acts, modifying the 1967 Constitution to suit the mili-
tary regime.14 These acts were issued by three generals under the 
dubious authority that the military regime unilaterally conferred 
upon them.15 While the Brazilian people were hopeful that the new 
military government would give more power to the citizens, unjust 
political maneuvers occurred—the most notable maneuver was In-
stitutional Act 5, which disbanded Congress, suspended habeas cor-
pus for political crimes, and increased overall censorship in Brazil.16 
While the military regime is understood as a dark phase in Brazilian 
history, marked by censorship and disarray, it was also a motivating 
factor for Brazil to return to democratic governance. 
From 1974-1985, Brazil entered a political phase of liberaliza-
tion known as distensão, when the major authoritarian features of 
the 1967 Constitution were relaxed by constitutional amendments.17 
While the amendments showed signs of Brazil’s turn towards de-
mocracy, Brazil’s first civilian president, Tancredo Neves, who died 
before taking office, strongly supported adoption of a new Consti-
tution.18 His vice president, José Sarney, proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would empower the next Congress to serve as a 
constituent assembly.19 However, the amendment was politically 
unjust because the next Congress included twenty-three senators 
elected under the prior authoritarian regime’s 1982 electoral legis-
lation.20 Thus, the twenty-three senators had no direct voter mandate 
to serve as part of the constitutional assembly.21 Before passing the 
                                                                                                             
 12 See Pablo Uchoa, Remembering Brazil’s Decades of Military Repression, 
BBC NEWS: BBC BRASIL, (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
latin-america-26713772. 
 13 See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient 
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 774 (1990). 
 14 Id. at 774. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 775. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient 
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 775 (1990). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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amendment, Congress was not yet aware of the conservative Sar-
ney’s corrupt motives, even while he attempted to sabotage the en-
tire Congressional process up until the very last draft to the Consti-
tution had been created.22 
B. Finally, Democracy 
Despite the President’s motives to halt the creation of a more 
democratic Constitution, the current Constitution was drafted with 
the hopes of bringing in a new, democratic government to Brazil. 
1985 marked the end of the military regime, as Brazil elected a pres-
ident through a democratic process. 23 A new Brazilian Constitution 
was adopted in 1988 to reflect the nation’s changing political 
scheme.24 On November 15, 1989, the entire Brazilian electorate 
had its first opportunity in nearly 30 years to vote directly for a pres-
idential candidate, which was an incredible political accomplish-
ment for the nation.25 Under the prior military regime, the right to 
vote was restricted to generals.26 The current 1988 Constitution dif-
fers drastically from its predecessor to reflect Brazil’s change from 
a military government to that of a democracy.27 Consequently, the 
Constitution weakened the executive in order to strengthen the leg-
islature.28 The present Constitution states that the House or the Sen-
ate, or any of its committees, can require that any Minister of State 
appear in person before it to testify or answer interrogatories and 
that failure to do so constitutes good cause for impeachment.29 One 
of the greatest changes, however, from the 1967 Constitution to the 
1988 Constitution was the restoration of law making power to Con-
gress.30 This was a major change from the prior military regime, un-
der which significant legislation was proposed and enacted solely 
                                                                                                             
 22 Id. at 777. 
 23 Id. at 773. (“The election was held pursuant to Brazil’s Constitution, which 
provided the critical framework for restoration of full democracy.”). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient 
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 773 (1990). 
 26 See id. at 783-84. 
 27 Id. at 783. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 783-784. 
 30 Id. at 784. 
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by Executive Decree.31 Furthermore, the Constitution sought to give 
Congress exclusive power to control rule making by administrative 
agencies.32 Thus, in theory, all acts of the Executive are made sub-
ject to either direct control of Congress, or through control of the 
Chamber of Deputies, or the Senate.33 Curiously, however, despite 
the number of constitutional provisions decreasing the power of the 
Executive, the drafters of the Constitution nevertheless allowed the 
Executive to issue provisional measures by decree. The provisional 
measures apparently were an oversight, left in when the Constitu-
tional Assembly shifted from a parliamentary system to a presiden-
tial system.34 Provisional measures were valid as laws for only thirty 
days, but Congress seldom adopted or rejected these provisional 
measures within this short period.35 Brazilian presidents reacted by 
reissuing provisional measures every month until adopted or re-
jected by Congress. Such essentially unchecked power created the 
potential for corruption—far greater than what can be fathomed in 
the United States. Moreover, drafting issues that are blatantly appar-
ent in the current Constitution have arguably led to an even greater 
number of corruption scandals than were seen under the military re-
gime.36 
III. SUMMARY OF CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS REGARDING 
IMPEACHMENT—THE BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION AND LAW NO. 
1079 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION USED TO COMPARE 
THE UNITED STATES’ IMPEACHMENT PROCESS TO BRAZIL’S. 
In order to understand how the impeachment process functions 
in Brazil, it is important to compare carefully the 1988 Brazilian 
                                                                                                             
 31 See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient 
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 784 (1990). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Brazil Assembly Backs Presidential System, (March 23, 1988), NY 
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/23/world/brazil-assembly-backs-presi-
dential-system.html?mcubz=0. 
 35 Rosenn, supra note 13, at 784. 
 36 See generally Barbara Geddes & Artur Ribeiro Neto, Institutional Sources 
of Corruption in Brazil, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL REFORM IN BRAZIL: THE 
IMPACT OF COLLOR’S IMPEACHMENT 1, 21-48 (Keith S. Rosenn & Richard 
Downes eds., 1999). 
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Constitution to that of the United States Constitution. Moreover, I 
will be discussing the key, relevant impeachment law that was in-
troduced in Brazil in 1950, Law No. 1079. What will be readily ap-
parent is that Brazil’s reigning law on the issue of corruption and 
impeachment is not consistent with the current Brazilian Constitu-
tion’s provisions regarding impeachment. This has created a prob-
lematic scenario for Brazil. 
A. Impeachment Under the United States Constitution 
A substantial difference between the United States Constitution 
and the Brazilian Constitution is the definition of impeachable of-
fenses.37 Unlike the Brazilian Constitution, which sets out a detailed 
list of impeachable offenses, the United States Constitution charac-
terizes impeachable offenses as simply, “Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”38 While the meaning of bribery 
and treason is clear, the meaning of the term “high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors” has remained unclear.39 It has frequently been argued 
that an indictable crime is always a prerequisite for impeachment, 
but this argument has not been accepted in practice.40 This argument 
was most notably discussed in the cases of Justice Samuel Chase, 
President Andrew Johnson, and President Richard Nixon.41 In the 
United States Congress’s proposal for the impeachment of President 
Nixon, the House Judiciary Committee emphatically stated that “a 
showing of criminality is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
specification of an impeachable offense.”42 
A notable feature of the United States Constitution is that im-
peachment is a civil and not a criminal proceeding.43 Alexander 
                                                                                                             
 37 See Fabio Konder Comparato, The Impeachment Process and the Consti-
tutional Significance of the Collor Affair, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL 
REFORM IN BRAZIL: THE IMPACT OF COLLOR’S IMPEACHMENT 1, 74-77 (Keith S. 
Rosenn & Richard Downes eds., 1999). 
 38 U.S. CONST., art.II, § 4). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Foun-
dation Press, 2nd ed. 1988). 
 43 Fábio Konder Comparato, The Impeachment Process and the Constitu-
tional Significance of the Collor Affair, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL REFORM 
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Hamilton stated, “[impeachment] can never be tied down by such 
strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors 
or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve 
to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security.”44 
Impeachment creates no double jeopardy bar to a prior or subse-
quent criminal prosecution, at least for federal officials other than 
the President and Vice President. According to Article I, section III 
of the U.S. Constitution, a person convicted of impeachable charges 
is subject to indictment, trial, and judgment before the judiciary.45 
The provision states, “[j]udgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not 
extend further than to removal  from Office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub-
ject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to 
Law.”46 
In 1989, Alcee Hastings, a sitting federal judge, was impeached 
for the same offense for which he had been acquitted by a jury in a 
criminal trial.47 It is not clear, however, whether a sitting president 
or vice president can be indicted and tried prior to impeachment. 
The issue was raised when former Vice President, Spiro Agnew was 
indicted for crimes allegedly committed prior to being sworn in as 
Vice President when he was governor of the state of Maryland.48 
The issue remained unresolved because Agnew’s lawyers entered 
into a plea-bargain in which Agnew agreed to resign in 1973.49 The 
issue actually came before the United States Supreme Court in U.S. 
v. Nixon, where President Nixon claimed that he could not be con-
stitutionally named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Watergate 
                                                                                                             
IN BRAZIL: THE IMPACT OF COLLOR’S IMPEACHMENT 1, 74 (Keith S. Rosenn & 
Richard Downes eds., 1999). 
 44 Id. at 75. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 45 Comparato, supra note 37, at 75. 
 46 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 3. 
 47 David Johnston, Hastings Ousted as Senate Vote Convicts Judge, NY 
TIMES (October 21, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/21/us/hastings-
ousted-as-senate-vote-convicts-judge.html. 
 48 United States Senate, Spiro T. Agnew, 39th Vice President (1969-1973), 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ge-
neric/VP_Spiro_Agnew.htm. 
 49 Id. 
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Scandal.50 The issue remained unresolved because the Supreme 
Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.51 
The issue also came up in 1998, when Independent Counsel Kenneth 
Star decided to recommend impeachment charges to Congress rather 
than seek to indict William Clinton when he was still a sitting Pres-
ident.52 After Clinton’s acquittal by the Senate on charges of ob-
struction of justice and perjury, both federal criminal offenses, Rob-
ert Ray, who replaced Star as Independent Counsel in October 1999, 
elected not to seek to indict Clinton until after he left office in Jan-
uary 2001.53 Just before leaving office, Clinton avoided indictment 
by reaching an agreement with the Independent Counsel under 
which Clinton admitted publically that certain statements made un-
der oath after his relationship with Monica Lewinsky were false and 
agreed to surrender his license to practice law for five years.54 The 
issue may arise again as special prosecutor Robert Mueller investi-
gates whether there is sufficient evidence to charge President Don-
ald Trump with criminal charges with respect to his role in the cur-
rent investigation regarding Russia’s interference with the 2016 
presidential election and the dismissal of James Comey.55 
Furthermore, the United States Constitution lays out the im-
peachment proceedings quite simply. Under Article II, Section IV 
of the Constitution, the text, with the heading “Disqualification” 
states, “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors.”56 Article I, Section III elaborates on the process, stat-
ing: 
                                                                                                             
 50 See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See A Chronology: Key Moments in the Clinton-Lewinsky Saga, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/resources/lewinsky/timeline/. 
 53 Neil A. Lewis, Transition In Washington: The President; Exiting Job, 
Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal, (Jan. 20, 2011), NY TIMES, http://www.ny-
times.com/2001/01/20/us/transition-in-washington-the-president-exiting-job-
clinton-accepts-immunity-deal.html?mcubz=0. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See Evan Perez, Pamela Brown, & Shimon Prokupecz, One Year into the 
FBI’s Russia Investigation, Mueller is on the Trump Money Trail, CNN (Aug. 4, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/mueller-investigation-russia-
trump-one-year-financial-ties/index.html. 
 56 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4. 
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The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Im-
peachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall 
be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the 
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: 
And no Person shall be convicted without the Con-
currence of two thirds of the Members present. Judg-
ment in Cases of Impeachments shall not extend fur-
ther than to removal from Office, and disqualifica-
tion to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or 
Profit under the United States, but the Party con-
victed shall nevertheless be liable and subject to In-
dictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, accord-
ing to Law.57 
This section of the United States Constitution has not been 
amended and, as discussed below, contrasts starkly with Brazil’s 
1988 Constitution and its detailed law on impeachments. Brazil’s 
provisions regarding the impeachment process are much lengthier 
and have been amended a number of times to reflect Brazil’s histor-
ical transition to democracy throughout the years. 
B. Impeachment Under the Brazilian Constitution 
Impeachable offenses under the Brazilian Constitution are 
known as crimes de responsabilidade, or crimes of responsibility.58 
Article 85 of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution states, “[a]cts of the Presi-
dent of the Republic that are attempts against the Federal Constitu-
tion are impeachable offenses, especially those against the: exist-
ence of the Union; free exercise of the powers of the Legislature, 
Judiciary, Public Prosecutor’s Office, and constitutional powers of 
the units of the Federation; exercise of political, individual and so-
cial rights; internal security of the country; probity in administra-
tion; the budget law; and compliance with the laws and court deci-
sions.59 Furthermore, Article 86 states, “[i]f two-thirds of the Cham-
                                                                                                             
 57 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
 58 Comparato, supra note 37, at 75. 
 59 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 85 (Braz.). (citing 
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constitutepro-
ject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf). 
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ber of Deputies accept an accusation against the President of the Re-
public, he shall be tried before the Supreme Federal Tribunal for 
common criminal offenses or before the Federal Senate for im-
peachable offenses.”60  Brazil’s monarchical Constitution of 1824 
did not permit impeachment of the Emperor but did provide for re-
moval of ministers of state for all criminal liability. 61 The Brazilian 
Constitution of 1891, the country’s first democratic constitution, 
continued the tradition of criminal liability as grounds for impeach-
ment.62 After describing specific instances for presidential impeach-
ment, the Constitution provided that “said crimes shall be defined in 
a special law.”63 This feature of the Constitution has been main-
tained by all subsequent Constitutions.64 Brazil has since enacted 
two successive laws defining impeachable offenses, as well as es-
tablishing procedural rules for trials of impeachable offenses.65 The 
first was Law 30 of 1892, and the second is Law 1079 of 1950, 
which is still in force in Brazil.66 
The 1988 Constitution expanded the list of impeachable officials 
beyond those identified under previous Constitutions in Brazil.67 
Previously, the president, vice president, ministers of state, and 
judges of the Federal Supreme Court were the only federal officials 
who could be impeached.68 The current Constitution added the at-
torney general of the republic, the federal general counsel, members 
of the Superior Courts, members of the Federal Tribunal of Ac-
counts, and the chiefs of permanent diplomatic missions.69 
The 1988 Constitution additionally defined who could be tried 
by the Senate.  Only the president, vice president, members of the 
Supreme Court, the attorney general, and the state advocate general 
                                                                                                             
 60 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 86 (Braz.). (citing 
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constitutepro-
ject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf). 
 61 Id.   
 62 Comparato, supra note 37, at 76. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Comparato, supra note 37, at 76.   
 68 Id.   
 69 Id. 
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are tried before the Senate.70 Ministers of state are tried by the Sen-
ate only in cases of impeachable offenses related to such offenses 
committed by the president.71 The remaining officials that are listed 
within the Constitution are charged and tried before the Brazilian 
Supreme Court.72 Under the Brazilian system, an impeached presi-
dent is suspended from duty pending the outcome of his Senate 
trial.73 Article 51(I) states that the Chamber of Deputies has exclu-
sive power by a two-thirds vote to authorize the institution of legal 
charges against the President and Vice President, and the Ministers 
of the Federal Government.74 Article 52(I) gives the Senate exclu-
sive power to try the President, Vice President, Ministers of the Fed-
eral Government, and Commanders of the Navy, Army and the Air 
force for impeachable offenses.75 
A two- thirds vote of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is re-
quired to bring impeachment charges.76 This differs from the United 
States’ proceedings because only a majority vote of the House of 
Representatives is needed.77 Following the vote, the Chamber must 
then prepare an impeachment report and appoint a committee in 
Congress to draft the report discussing whether the charges are 
grounded or not.78 The Senate must also create a committee to dis-
cuss the charges and eventually vote on if the impeachment should 
occur.79 A two-thirds majority vote in the Senate is needed to con-
vict those officials entitled to be tried by the Senate.80 The process 
                                                                                                             
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Comparato, supra note 37, at 74. 
 74 Id. at 76. (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 51 
(Braz.). 
 75 Id. (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 52 (Braz.) 
(citing Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.consti-
tuteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf). 
 76 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 51 (Braz.) (citing 
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constitutepro-
ject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf). 
 77 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION art. 52 (Braz.) (citing Bra-
zil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constitutepro-
ject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf). 
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overall is quite convoluted and more complex than what is seen in 
the United States. 
The 1988 Constitution made important amendments to ensure a 
more democratic system and with more tools to use against the ex-
ecutive. For example, the 1988 Constitution was designed to weaken 
the executive and to strengthen the legislative and judicial branches 
of government.81 Thus, the current Constitution of Brazil ensures 
more accountability between the president and Congress, which 
aided in the impeachment of Collor de Mello, Brazil’s first demo-
cratically elected president after the 1988 Constitution went into 
force.82  Additionally either house of Brazil’s Congress, or one of its 
committees, can require any executive minister to appear personally 
to testify or answer interrogatories.83 If an executive minister fails 
to appear without good cause, he may be impeached under the cur-
rent Constitution.84 
Furthermore, one major issue with the impeachment process in 
Brazil is that there is considerable discourse regarding the true na-
ture of impeachable offenses and what they fully entail.85 Despite 
the explicit language of the 1988 Constitution, one view is that the 
Brazilian impeachment proceeding does not encompass crimes but 
rather deals with, “political offenses, related to unlawfulness of a 
political nature, and politically sanctioned.”86 The other view, 
adopted by Brazil’s Supreme Court, is that impeachment is a com-
bination of both political and criminal proceedings.87 Impeachable 
offenses may be actual crimes and are thus subject to the fundamen-
tal principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, meaning nei-
ther crime nor punishment without law.88 Such crimes, tried before 
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a political branch and not before the judiciary, also have a political 
sanction.89 
Moreover, Brazil has two alternatives to impeachment that are 
important to differentiate. First, the Electoral Tribunal can find that 
an election was corrupt and can quash the president’s mandate. For 
example, on June 9, 2017, Brazil’s top electoral court voted to reject 
allegations of campaign finance violations that could have removed 
Temer from office.90 Judges voted 4-3 against overturning the 2014 
presidential election despite Dilma’s impeachment and Temer’s bal-
looning corruption scandal and disastrously low popularity among 
Brazilians.91  A guilty verdict would have annulled the 2014 election 
and stripped Temer of the rest of his mandate.92 Additionally, a 
guilty verdict would have stripped both Rousseff and Temer of their 
political rights for eight years.93 A second alternative to impeach-
ment is the criminal conviction of a sitting president by the Supreme 
Court.94 If two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies approve, a sitting 
president can be prosecuted on criminal charges before the Supreme 
Court.95 The current Brazilian President, Michel Temer was charged 
with corruption by the Prosecutor General, but not even a simple 
majority voted to allow the Chamber of Deputies’ prosecution to go 
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to trial.96 However, the Prosecutor General recently filed new cor-
ruption charges against Temer.97 
C. Law No. 1079 (1950)- Crimes of Responsibility 
As stated above, Brazil’s current impeachment statute is Law 
1079, enacted in 1950.98  Law 1079 differs from the Brazilian Con-
stitution in that it defines impeachable offenses only for the presi-
dent, vice president, ministers of state, members of the Supreme 
Court, and the attorney general of the republic.99 However, Law 
1079 was amended by Law 10.028 in 2000, which added Art. 40-A, 
sole paragraph, which extends the list of officials subject to im-
peachment to: The Advocate General of the Union, the Procurator 
Generals of Labor, Elections and Military, the Procurator Generals 
of the State and the Federal District and to members of the Federal 
and State Public Ministries, the Advocacy General of the Union, and 
state prosecutors when acting as head of regional or local units of 
their agencies.100 Thus, all of these governmental officials can be 
impeached using Law 1079, which is inconsistent with the Brazilian 
Constitution’s treatment of impeachment.101 Furthermore, even 
starker differences are apparent between Law 1079 and the current 
Constitution. Law 1079, as well as Decree- Law No. 201, both state 
that the crimes being defined in the law, even when simply an at-
tempt, are liable for the penalty of loss of the position with the ina-
bility to exercise any public function for at least five years.102 The 
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current Brazilian Constitution, however, declares that the im-
peached official loses his political and civil rights for eight years.103 
As stated, Brazil enacted Law No. 10.028, which made various 
amendments to the 1950 Impeachment Law.104 For example, Art. 
40A was added making crimes of the Procurator-General of the Re-
public, or of his substitute when acting as head of the Public Minis-
try of the Union, impeachable offenses under the 1950 Law.105 Be-
cause Brazilians have adhered to the law in only finding impeacha-
ble offenses for the officials of the president, vice president, minis-
ters of state, members of the Supreme Court, and the attorney gen-
eral of the republic, it is readily apparent that Law 1079 is given 
significant weight, even comparable to the Brazilian Constitution it-
self.106 In fact, the Collor impeachment was carried out pursuant to 
Law 1079, as well as the special rules drafted by the chief justice of 
the Supreme Court pursuant to his authority as presiding officer of 
the Senate trial.107 Thus, the impeachment provisions under the 1988 
Constitution were not the primary source of the rules governing Col-
lor’s impeachment.108 However, Collor was banned from public of-
fice for eight years, indicating that in some respects, the current Con-
stitution holds key provisions that the Senate still follows. 
The crimes of responsibility set out in Law 1079 include crimes 
against the existence of the Union, meaning crimes that threaten the 
existence of the Brazilian federal government.109 Such crimes in-
clude threats to government intelligence, for example.110 Further-
more, the law includes crimes against the free exercise of constitu-
tional powers; crimes against the exercise of political, individual, 
and social rights; crimes against homeland security, crimes against 
the administration of justice, crimes against budget laws (a crime 
that Rousseff was impeached for), crimes against the safekeeping 
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and legal employment of public funds, and crimes against the en-
forcement of judicial decisions.111 While it is apparent that Brazil 
has followed, and will likely continue to adhere to, Law 1079 on 
matters of impeachment, the statute should be further amended to 
align with the 1988 Constitution. It additionally should be noted that 
during the Collor affair, the Supreme Court took the liberty of sim-
plifying the impeachment process by modifying or simply choosing 
to ignore certain provisions of Law 1079 in order to shorten the pro-
cedure.112 Moreover, when the Court did so, Brazil’s Congress was 
relieved, as Collor’s impeachment may have easily taken numerous 
months to complete, which could have been both politically and eco-
nomically disastrous for Brazil.113 
IV. MODERN IMPEACHMENTS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES. 
A. The Impeachment of Collor 
Brazilian President Fernando Affonso Collor de Mello served as 
President from 1990-1992.114 As Brazil’s first directly elected pres-
ident since 1960, Collor represented a critical component to Brazil’s 
new attempt at democracy.115 Collor was additionally governing un-
der Brazil’s new Constitution and portrayed himself as the president 
who would do away with corruption, inefficiency, and a highly in-
flationary economy.116  While Collor began his presidency with a 
triumphant start, he very quickly declined as the leading figure of 
Brazil.117 There are several reasons why Collor began to lose favor 
among Brazilian citizens. For instance, Collor resorted to a political 
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device for the clear purpose of bypassing Brazil’s Congress.118 The 
device is known as the medida provisória, and is a device that has 
been commonly used by Brazilian presidents.119 Brazil’s Constitu-
tion permits Presidents to issue decrees with the force of law that 
take immediate effect.120 While these provisional decrees were the-
oretically void ab initio if not adopted by Congress within 30 days, 
Collor routinely reissued them until Congress either converted them 
into law or rejected them.121 Indeed, the controversial Collor Plan, 
which froze virtually all bank deposits for 18 months, was issued 
and reissued many times as a provisional decree before Congress 
eventually enacted it as law.122 While this power had been a favorite 
of the general-presidents of Brazil’s military past (also used liberally 
by President Sarney), Collor implemented the device 141 times in 
1990 alone.123 Collor’s strategy angered many in Congress and in-
stigated numerous court challenges.124 Eventually, the Supreme 
Court declared that reissuing provisional decrees was an unconsti-
tutional procedure but only if they had been specifically rejected by 
Congress.125 Finally, in 2001, Congress adopted Constitutional 
Amendment No. 32, which prohibited presidents from issuing pro-
visional decrees in many areas, such as nationality, citizenship, po-
litical parties and rights, criminal and procedural law, and budgetary 
matters.126  To prevent another Collor Plan, Amendment No. 32 also 
prohibited any provisional decree from detaining or sequestering 
property or any financial assets.127 It also made provisional decrees 
valid for 60 days rather than 30 days, a period that could be extended 
only once for another 60 days if Congress failed to act.128 This 
means provisional decrees normally have a maximum life of 120 
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days.129  Moreover, a provisional decree that lapses is no longer void 
ab initio; any legal relations constituted under a lapsed decree must 
be regulated by legislative decree.130 
Another major issue that led to Collor’s eventual impeachment 
was his failure to stabilize Brazil’s declining economy.131  Collor’s 
drastic economic stabilization plan, which froze bank accounts for 
18 months, failed within less than a year, proceeding a major reces-
sion accompanied by vast unemployment.132 Similar to the Wa-
tergate scandal in the United States, the press played an important 
role in Collor’s downfall.133 Because journalists had been censored 
during Brazil’s military regime, the media did not hold back in print-
ing stories of both Collor’s unfortunate personality traits (Collor was 
known as one of Brazil’s most arrogant presidents) and numerous 
scandals, constantly putting Collor on the defensive.134 
The primary scandal of Collor’s presidency occurred in May of 
1992, when Collor’s brother accused him of operating a corruption 
scheme through Collor’s campaign treasurer, Paulo César Farias.135 
Following the scandal, thousands took to the streets to protest Col-
lor.136 Only four months later, on September 1, 1992, impeachment 
proceedings were initiated.137 The Chamber of Deputies brought im-
peachment charges against President Collor on two grounds: that he 
allowed, “expressly or tacitly, the breach of law and order” and that 
he behaved in a way incompatible with the dignity, honor, and de-
cency of the office.138 Collor pled not guilty in the Senate.139 Similar 
to the customary plea in United States impeachment cases, Collor 
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contended that an indictable common crime was required for im-
peachment.140 Because a breach of law and order, as well as behav-
ior that is incompatible with dignity, is not technically an indictable 
common crime, Collor argued that he could not be impeached.141 
Color additionally argued against the vagueness of the legal provi-
sions, contesting that they did not comply with the constitutional re-
quirement of the previous definition of a criminal offense.142 As 
stated above, the impeachment of Collor was done through both 
Law 1079, the internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies, and by 
special rules drafted by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, as he 
has special authority as president of the Senate during the impeach-
ment trial.143 However, because the Constitution itself was not the 
sole law followed during the impeachment proceeding, legal incon-
gruity persisted.144Although Collor technically resigned in an at-
tempt to prevent his trial of impeachment by the Brazilian Senate, 
the Senate voted to continue its impeachment proceedings.145 
On December 30, 1992, by the required two-thirds Senate ma-
jority, the Senate voted 76-3 to convict Collor on charges of official 
misconduct.146 It is clear, based on the mere three votes against his 
impeachment, how immensely unpopular Collor was at the time. 
Regardless of Collor’s contentions against the proceeding, Collor 
was swiftly impeached and succeeded by Vice President Itamar 
Franco.147 Collor was later acquitted on ordinary criminal charges 
in his trial before Brazil’s Supreme Court, ostensibly due to lack of 
valid evidence.148 
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B. The Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff 
The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff signifies that now half of 
Brazil’s elected presidents in its post-1989, democratic era have 
been impeached. Similar to Collor’s impeachment, Rousseff’s im-
peachment was likely not caused by one individual scandal. 
Rousseff too was handed a difficult presidency due to Brazil’s im-
mensely struggling economy, leading to anger and outcry from Bra-
zilian citizens. With Brazilians desperately wanting their economy 
to return to the days of growth and stability, citizens were demand-
ing a return to substantial economic growth. 
In 2014, prosecutors, judges, and federal police began to un-
cover a multi-billion dollar kickback and bribery scandal at the state-
run oil firm Petrobras.149 The kickback scheme, known in English 
as Operation Car Wash, began in 2004, but the federal investigation 
began in 2014.150 The accusations were brought by federal prosecu-
tors mainly before a state court judge in Paraná, Judge Sergio Moro, 
who gained popularity among Brazilians as someone willing to take 
on the nation’s most power leaders.151 Petrobras was the largest 
Latin American company until the scandal leaked.152 Contracts were 
inflated,153 and a portion of the bribes were channeled to the three 
Brazilian political parties that had previously formed a ruling coali-
tion.154 The three parties included the Workers Party (Rousseff’s 
party), the Democratic Movement Party of Brazil, and the Progres-
sive Party.155 The scheme had grown to include other parties and 
Brazilian projects, such as the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam.156 
While some felt the scandal was merely a way to end the 13 years 
of Worker’s Party rule and to sweep from the government the older 
ruling parties, it has become increasingly apparent that funds were 
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being inappropriately used to benefit specific political parties, poli-
ticians, and government officials or contractors.157 The Petrobras 
scandal has had disastrous effects on the Brazilian government.158 
Bribes were essential for building coalitions because of the vast 
number of political parties within Brazil.159 No single party has ever 
been near to a commanding majority in Congress, so support is gen-
erally bought with cabinet posts and direct bribes.160 Additionally, 
the sheer size of Brazil, as well as the three levels of government 
with regular municipal, state, and national elections, have fostered a 
corrupt scheme in Brazilian politics.161 The scandal has additionally 
been detrimental to business as prosecutors had ordered the suspen-
sion of contracts between Petrobras and its primary suppliers, which 
unfortunately included nearly all of Brazil’s largest construction and 
shipping firms.162 Perhaps even more shocking, in approximately 
two years, 61% of Petrobras’ 276,000 employees have lost their 
jobs.163 Moreover, numerous smaller firms depended on Petrobras’ 
business and have consequently become bankrupt due to the scan-
dal.164 Some believe that the scandal could have a positive effect on 
Brazil’s government, potentially punishing the corrupt politicians 
who were involved and beginning a new era of clean government.165 
However, it may be difficult to both pinpoint exactly who was di-
rectly involved in the scheme and to give Brazilians any sort of time 
frame for bringing to justice all those who may have been in-
volved.166 
Prosecutors claim that former President da Silva (or Lula, as 
most refer to him) was the primary figure in charge of the scheme, 
though he strongly denies violating any law.167 Judge Moro has 
since convicted Lula, sentencing him to nine years in jail and seizing 
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all of his assets.168 One major issue that divided the nation is whether 
and if so, how much, Dilma Rousseff has been involved with the 
Petrobras scandal? Currently, prosecutors have not found evidence 
that Rousseff was involved in the scheme.169 Even more illuminat-
ing, many of Rousseff’s political enemies have conceded that 
Rousseff is one of the few politicians in Brazil to not accept 
bribes.170 However, it is widely thought that Rousseff must have at 
least known what was occurring, as she chaired the board of direc-
tors of Petrobras at the peak of the scandal.171 Many in favor of 
Rousseff’s impeachment argue that, even if she was merely aware 
of the scandal and did not directly participate, she still benefitted 
from the illegal campaign funds and did nothing to stop the wide-
scale corruption.172 Moreover, many question Rousseff’s attempt to 
appoint Lula to her cabinet, to give him the shield of the privileged 
forum.173 
One impeachment petition accepted by the Chamber of Deputies 
(out of 37 petitions filed) charged Rousseff with criminal activity by 
failing to investigate and prevent Operation Car Wash.174 The Proc-
urator General took the position that a sitting president could not be 
charged with crimes committed before her presidency, a position 
subsequently affirmed by Minister Teori Zauski of the Supreme 
Federal Court.175 Therefore, the Chamber of Deputies found only 
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the budgetary charges.176 However on September 5, 2017, the Proc-
urator General of Brazil charged Lula and Dilma before the Supreme 
Federal Court with a series of crimes including cartel formation, cor-
ruption, and money laundering.177 
While the Petrobras scandal substantially hurt Rousseff’s public 
image, the principal charge brought against her was misappropriat-
ing government funds to aid her reelection campaign.178 Rousseff 
was accused of misusing government accounts before the last pres-
idential election to make her appear more favorable to Brazilian cit-
izens and create a false visage to aid in her reelection.179 Her critics 
charged that Rousseff’s government filled holes in its accounts by 
accepting loans from state banks without the approval of Con-
gress.180 Rousseff’s critics contested that this form of pedaladas, or 
pedaling scheme, allowed her administration to fund social welfare 
programs using funds that were not authorized by Congress.181 
Rousseff argued that the money was not being used as a loan be-
cause it was merely being transferred through state banks from pub-
lic coffers.182 Rousseff contested that the impeachment proceedings 
were used as a coup d’état against her, as it gave her enemies the 
opportunity to remove her from office without waiting for the next 
presidential election.183 Additionally, she argued that prior admin-
istrations had practiced similar schemes.184 
While such scandals should not be taken lightly, many argue that 
the alleged corruption was being directly used against Rousseff for 
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the purpose of throwing her out of office. Like Collor, Rousseff be-
came widely unpopular among Brazilians and became the scapegoat 
for Brazil’s multiple crises.185 However, also similar to Collor, 
Dilma has been viewed as a highly arrogant politician, often too 
proud to concede or negotiate and even turning members of her own 
party against her.186 Thus, Rousseff’s harsh, stubborn demeanor 
aided in the alienation of her own allies and added more fuel to the 
fire. 
On April 17, 2016, the lower house of Brazil’s Congress voted 
in favor of impeaching Rousseff 367 to 137,187 meeting the neces-
sary two-thirds majority to send the charges to the Senate.188 If the 
lower house had not reached its two-thirds majority, the impeach-
ment proceedings would have abruptly ended, and Rousseff could 
have remained in office.189 
On May 12, 2016, the Senate voted on whether to begin the im-
peachment process.190 The Senate needed only a majority vote.191 
By a vote of 55 to 22, the Senate voted to begin impeachment. Con-
sequently, Rousseff was suspended from office.192 Next, the Senate, 
on August 9th 2016, voted on whether to proceed with the impeach-
ment Rousseff.193 Once again, a majority vote was needed to pass.194 
The Senate passed the vote 59 to 21 and Rousseff was consequently 
charged.195 In order to convict, the Senate needed a two-thirds ma-
jority to vote for the impeachment.196 On August 31, 2016, the Sen-
ate, by a margin of 61 to 20, voted to convict Rousseff, leaving her 
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center-right Vice President, Michel Temer, a member of the Brazi-
lian Democratic Movement Party, as Brazil’s new president.197 
Curiously, the Senate, with the approval of the President of the 
Supreme Federal Tribunal, split its impeachment vote into two: (1) 
whether to convict Rousseff; and (2) whether to deprive her of her 
political rights for eight years.198 On the second question, the Senate 
voted 42 to 36, with three abstentions.199 With the requisite two-
thirds majority lacking, Rousseff has retained her political rights.200 
The division into two votes is contemplated by the sole paragraph 
of Article 68 of Law 1079 of 1950, which provides, “if the affirma-
tive answer obtains at least two-thirds of the votes of the senators 
present, the President shall re-consult the plenary on the time not 
exceeding five years, during which the convicted person shall be 
disqualified from performing any public function.”201 On the other 
hand, the sole paragraph of Article 52 of the 1988 Constitution pro-
vides, “the President of the Supreme Federal Tribunal shall preside, 
and a conviction, which may only be rendered by two-thirds vote of 
the Federal Senate, shall be limited to the loss of office, with dis-
qualification to hold any public office for a period of eight years, 
without prejudice to any other judicial sanctions that may be appli-
cable.”202 Although numerous actions contesting the constitutional-
ity of dividing the Rousseff impeachment with two votes have been 
filed with the Supreme Federal Tribunal, no decision has yet been 
rendered on the matter. 
Temer swiftly named an all-male, all-while cabinet upon gaining 
seat to the presidency and is as unpopular, if not more, than Rousseff 
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herself.203 The attorney general of Brazil has now charged Temer 
with receiving money from the massive meatpacking firm JBS, 
which itself is already implicated in a corruption scandal.204 The 
charges have already been delivered to a Supreme Court judge who 
referred the question of whether Temer should be tried by the Su-
preme Federal Tribunal to the lower house of parliament. 205  A two-
thirds majority vote is needed to waive Temer’s immunity.206 On 
August 2, 2017, the Chamber of Deputies rejected the bid to waive 
Temer’s immunity by a vote of 238 against, 198 for.207 
Temer has already lost five of his cabinet picks to the Petrobras 
scandal, insinuating that a number of his cabinet choices were di-
rectly involved in the scandal and may continue to be questioned.208 
Time will eventually tell if Temer will develop into the leader that 
Brazil so desperately needs; however, with Temer already cloaked 
in corruption himself, the future appears bleak for the newly seated 
president. While the government did impeach Rousseff in accord-
ance with the Constitution and through democratic means, numer-
ous forms of corruption and instability remain within the Brazilian 
government that must be addressed. 
C. The Impeachment of Richard Nixon 
On July 27, 1974, the United States House Judiciary Committee 
recommended that President Nixon, the 37th president of the United 
States, be impeached and removed from the office of the presi-
dency.209 Unlike the Brazilian impeachments of Collor and 
Rousseff, which were the culmination of scandals and factors that 
resulted in an eventual impeachment, Nixon’s fall resulted from a 
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single political scandal known as Watergate.210 The scandal first 
erupted following a break-in, on June 17, 1972, at the Democratic 
Party’s national headquarters in the Watergate apartment-hotel com-
plex in Washington, D.C.211 The group of men who conducted the 
break-in were arrested and eventually linked to the White House.212 
While Nixon fiercely denied any involvement with the crime, sev-
eral of his staff members were implicated in an illegal cover-up and 
resigned.213 Government investigations revealed a political cam-
paign of dirty tricks by the Committee to Re-elect Nixon, along with 
a White House “enemies list.”214 In July 1973, a former Nixon staff-
member revealed the existence of privately taped conversations be-
tween the president and his aides.215 The government demanded that 
Nixon release the tapes; however, Nixon adamantly refused, arguing 
executive privilege and national security.216 A federal judge eventu-
ally ordered Nixon to turn the tapes over and, after the Supreme 
Court affirmed the order, Nixon did so (he did not provide all of the 
tapes; however, and on one tape, a portion of conversation seemed 
to have been erased).217 
On February 6, 1974, the House of Representatives passed 
House Resolution 803 by 410-4 to authorize the Judiciary Commit-
tee to consider impeachment proceedings against Nixon.218 The text 
of Resolution 803 stated, 
RESOLVED, That the Committee on the Judiciary 
acting as a whole or by any subcommittee thereof ap-
pointed by the Chairman for the purposes hereof and 
in accordance with the Rules of the Committee, is 
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authorized and directed to investigate fully and com-
pletely whether sufficient grounds exist for the 
House of Representatives to exercise its constitu-
tional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, Presi-
dent of the United States of America. The committee 
shall report to the House of Representatives such res-
olutions, articles of impeachment, or other recom-
mendations as it deems proper.219 
In May 1974, the United States House Judiciary Committee ini-
tiated formal impeachment hearings against President Nixon.220 In 
July, the first article of impeachment against Nixon, obstruction of 
justice, was passed.221 Two additional articles, for abuse of power 
and contempt of Congress, were approved on July 29th and 30th.222 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Nixon must pro-
vide transcripts of the missing tapes, as new evidence had clearly 
implicated Nixon as being involved in the cover-up.223 However, on 
August 8, 1974, Nixon announced his resignation, a remarkable an-
nouncement marking the first president in United States history to 
leave office voluntarily.224 Thus, while the House had voted to rec-
ommend Nixon for impeachment, he resigned before full impeach-
ment proceedings were carried out.225 Unlike Brazil, where the Sen-
ate impeached Collor after he resigned, the United States Congress 
dropped the impeachment charges against Nixon after his resigna-
tion. Nixon was succeeded by Vice President Gerald Ford.226 In a 
hotly contested move, Ford decided to pardon Nixon, making it im-
possible for former President Nixon to be prosecuted for any poten-
tial crimes committed while he served as president.227 Moreover, the 
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pardon was a major factor in Ford losing his bid for reelection to 
President Carter in 1976.228 
Nixon’s impeachment proceedings marked a difficult time for 
the United States and left citizens with feelings of doubt and mistrust 
towards their own president. The scandal additionally cast a dark 
cloud over the Republican Party of the United States, as clear cor-
ruption and misconduct had taken place. The United States has not 
seen the likes of such a massive government cover-up as was seen 
in Watergate. The event sent a message to the world that the power-
house country too had faults and would be willing to use its im-
peachment power— more than 100 years after the prior presidential 
impeachment of Andrew Johnson occurred in 1868.229 
D. The Impeachment of Bill Clinton 
The impeachment of President Bill Clinton began under odd cir-
cumstances and is quite unlike any other scandal that resulted in im-
peachment in United States history. In 1995, a woman named Mon-
ica Lewinsky began an internship in President Clinton’s office.230 
Lewinsky and Clinton allegedly became romantically involved even 
though Clinton was married.231 Lewinsky eventually left the intern-
ship for a paid position within the federal government, and over the 
next two years, allegedly had romantic encounters with the presi-
dent.232 In 1997, a separate sexual harassment allegation against 
Clinton arose, brought by a former Arkansas employee named Paula 
Jones.233 During the investigation, Lewinsky was subpoenaed and 
an alleged secret affair soon turned into a national fiasco.234 While 
                                                                                                             
 228 Joel Roberts, Nixon Pardon Defined Ford Presidency, CBS NEWS, (Dec. 
27, 2006), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nixon-pardon-defined-ford-presi-
dency/. 
 229 1974 House begins impeachment of Nixon, HISTORY http://www.his-
tory.com/this-day-in-history/house-begins-impeachment-of-nixon. 
 230 Julia Glum, Bill Clinton Impeachment Facts: How Monica Lewinsky Scan-
dal Affects Hillary’s Presidential Campaign, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES 
(July 26, 2017, 2:02 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/bill-clinton-impeachment-
facts-how-monica-lewinsky-scandal-affects-hillarys-2394926. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
160 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:129 
 
Lewinsky denied ever having an affair with Clinton, one of Lew-
insky’s coworkers, Linda Tripp, secretly recorded Lewinsky’s com-
ments about her relationship with Clinton.235 In 1998, President 
Clinton plainly rejected all allegations, famously stating, “I did not 
have sexual relations with that woman.”236 However, Clinton was 
later investigated by a grand jury and admitted to inappropriate inti-
mate contact with Lewinsky.237 
Special prosecutor Kenneth Starr, who was originally appointed 
to investigate the Whitewater Land scandal, submitted a report to 
Congress with eleven causes for impeaching President Clinton.238 
Among the causes were perjury and abuse of power.239 While this 
scandal involved only a consensual affair with another woman, the 
report claimed that Clinton’s choices were “inconsistent with the 
president’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.”240 On 
December 20, 1998, the House of Representatives impeached Clin-
ton on two of Starr’s eleven charges, perjury and obstructing jus-
tice.241 Clinton, however, did not resign.242  In January 1999, Clinton 
was tried in the Senate, which never reached the two-thirds majority 
needed to convict Clinton.243 A vote of 67 was necessary to convict, 
but only 45 voted to convict on the perjury charge, while 50 voted 
to convict on the obstruction of justice charge. Thus, Clinton was 
acquitted of both charges but still offered an apology to the Ameri-
can people.244 Clinton finished his term in January 2001 as the 42nd 
President of the United States.245 
President Bill Clinton’s impeachment serves an important les-
son: a United States president can be impeached under almost any 
circumstance. Here, a president was impeached for having an affair 
and lying about it. Many were left wondering if impeachment was 
an appropriate tool to use under such a circumstance. Was it fair to 
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label Clinton as a president who could no longer faithfully execute 
the laws simply because he had an extramarital relationship with an-
other woman? No great corruption occurred; no major U.S. secrets 
leaked. Did his conduct come anywhere close to “high crimes and 
misdemeanors,” or was this really a political vendetta by a partisan 
House of Representatives? Great disagreement on the matter is still 
widely discussed today in the United States. While some are un-
doubtedly still angry with the former president for engaging in a 
scandalous affair, perhaps many others have quickly forgotten, as 
Clinton to this day is known as one of America’s greatest and most 
popular presidents.246 
V. IMPEACHMENT IN BRAZIL—A TOOL FOR AIDING OR ABETTING 
CORRUPTION? 
While, provisionally, the United States and Brazil handle the 
process of impeachment quite differently, both systems have bene-
fits and weaknesses. As stated above, under the Brazilian Constitu-
tion, an impeached president is suspended from the duty of holding 
office pending the outcome of his trial.247  In contrast, under the 
United States Constitution, an impeached president may continue to 
hold office pending the outcome of the Senate trial.248 The framers 
of the U.S. Constitution were concerned with other branches of gov-
ernment receiving too much power during the process and thus felt 
that the government would be in a more secure position with the 
president still in office.249 However, there are clear drawbacks to 
having a potentially scandalized and corrupt president continuing to 
hold office throughout the impeachment process. Perhaps he would 
attempt to swiftly enact a law or executive order that would directly 
benefit himself or offer forms of protection. Most notably, the pres-
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ident has the power to disburse public funds and to secure free ac-
cess to broadcast and television networks.250 Consequently, the pres-
ident has enormous control over public opinion, able to swiftly shut 
off channels of communication among his citizenry.251 While such 
a response has not commonly occurred in the United States, it is a 
common feature in executive-heavy nations and the world has seen 
the danger that can erupt. While the framers of the Constitution of 
Brazil tried to ensure that the executive does not have too great 
power, the Brazilian President still has vastly greater power than 
does the United States President.252 While the United States enforces 
its checks and balances in a more democratic manner, Brazil’s im-
peachment provision suspending an impeached president from of-
fice is a safer practice. However, would it have been safer to remove 
Clinton from office merely because he engaged in sexual relations 
with a mistress? Was he a threat to the other branches of govern-
ment? Perhaps Brazil has created such a provision because, in such 
a strong executive nation, there are greater instances of the executive 
acting corruptly or acting to protect himself during the impeachment 
process. Additionally, in Brazil, a two-thirds majority of the Cham-
ber of Deputies is needed for the impeachment charges to be 
brought, while in the United States, only a majority vote of the 
House of Representatives is needed. 
In the United States, a president convicted on impeachment 
charges is permanently barred from public office. In Brazil, he or 
she may not hold office for eight years according to the Constitution, 
and for five years according to Law No. 1079.253 It remains unclear 
which, if either, is the operative provision in this respect.  Interest-
ingly, following Rousseff’s impeachment, the senate also voted to 
allow her to maintain her political rights and run for public office.254 
In the United States, no impeached president has had to face the 
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harsh punishment of losing his ability to run for public office. Nixon 
resigned before being tried in the Senate on impeachment charges 
and that resignation stopped the impeachment proceedings. Ford’s 
pardon stopped any criminal proceedings.  The impeachment 
against Clinton failed to receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and 
no criminal charges were brought against him afterwards. Such in-
stances vary starkly from the modern impeachments in Brazil. Both 
Collor and Rousseff were impeached and their convictions were 
quickly voted by the Brazilian Senate.255 Perhaps Brazil should 
adopt the United States’ provision of a permanent ban because if a 
president has engaged in substantial instances of corruption, it seems 
likely that only five or eight years later, he could be capable of com-
mitting corrupt acts once again. 
Another key difference between the impeachment process in 
Brazil and the United States is the source of law that explains how 
the impeachment proceeding will function. In the United States, 
only Article II, Section IV of the Constitution very briefly explains 
the impeachment process and precisely what is needed to impeach a 
president or other high-ranking executive official.256 The process is 
further elaborated in Article I, Section III of the Constitution, which 
discusses the required two-thirds majority in the Senate in order for 
the impeachment to be carried out.257 As seen in the attempted im-
peachments of Johnson and Clinton, the Senate was unable to reach 
the two-thirds majority. 
Unlike the United States Constitution, which briefly lays out 
what impeachment entails and under what circumstances an individ-
ual may be voted in for articles of impeachment, Brazil’s organiza-
tion of its impeachment proceedings is quite the opposite. As dis-
cussed in greater detail above, Brazil has given more weight of au-
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thority to the 1950 Impeachment Law No. 1079. In fact, the law dif-
fers in some respects to Brazil’s current Constitution. Until 
amended, the law only defined impeachable offenses for the presi-
dent, vice president, ministers of state, and the procurator general of 
the republic.258 Brazil has followed this aspect of the law even when 
the Brazilian Constitution said otherwise. Moreover, during the im-
peachment of Collor, Law No. 1079 was the primary law used to 
carry out the impeachment, even over the Constitution.259 While 
some would perhaps view this as a major downfall with Brazilians 
left perplexed as to which body of law to follow, for the time being, 
it is important that Law No. 1079 exists and is actually respected by 
Brazilian congressmen and citizens. Because Brazil’s government 
has transformed in major ways, as seen in its transition from a mili-
tary regime to a democratic government, the Constitution has had to 
be amended—even totally rewritten more than one hundred times. 
Because of the constant amendments and rewrites, Brazilian con-
gressmen and citizens alike do not view their own Constitution as a 
Constitution meant to endure for ages to come. While it is important 
that, at the very least, Brazilian law-makers adhere to Law No. 1079 
and have carried out what the law deems to be a proper impeach-
ment, as seen in Collor and Rousseff’s impeachments, Brazil must 
consolidate and simplify its sources of the law to better clarify the 
impeachment proceedings. For example, while Law No. 1079 states 
that the impeached individual cannot hold public office for five 
years, the current Constitution states that the individual loses politi-
cal rights for eight years.260 Such a provision is critical for Brazil to 
clarify in order for Congress to have better understanding of which 
is the correct form of punishment for the impeached individual. 
Thus, there was likely a large rift between part of the population who 
wanted Collor to stay as far away from public office for as long as 
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possible (wanting the eight-year loss of rights from the Constitu-
tional provision) and another part of the citizenry wanting Collor to 
return to public office and thus hoping for Law No. 1079 to be fol-
lowed. As previously stated, Collor’s impeachment was governed 
by a combination of both the Constitution and Law No. 1079, with 
the Senate deciding to halt his ability to run for office for the full 
eight years. While both the United States’ and Brazil’s impeachment 
provisions have flaws, no political device of such severity is a totally 
smooth procedure. What is more important is for both nations to 
continue aiming for as great of a democratic process as possible, as 
it will reflect the democratic nature of the government to each state’s 
citizens and the other nations throughout the world. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Impeachment has served as an incredibly important tool in both 
the United States and Brazil. It serves as a critical reminder to the 
executive that the people will hold him or her accountable for ac-
tions that go against the best interests of the nation—corruption, in-
appropriate usage of the budget, even for instances that go against 
society’s morals, as seen in the United States. 
What is clear is that Brazil has had to use the device of impeach-
ment frequently since the adoption of the 1988 Constitution, as Bra-
zil has vastly greater work to do to halt its numerous forms of cor-
ruption that still exist today. Thus, while impeachment is an im-
portant political tool used to abate corruption and hold leaders ac-
countable, it has not halted corruption in Brazil in a meaningful way.  
Until Brazil begins to rebuild its failing economy, as well as build 
its once booming presence in South America, the people of Brazil 
will continue to find reasons, even if they are misplaced, to blame 
the president. Such has been the case with the impeachment of 
Dilma Rousseff. It is likely that Rousseff was aware that bribes were 
being given, yet it is more likely that she was impeached simply due 
to the state of the economy and the clear lack of popularity that she 
had in her final days as president (arguably also due to her well-
known arrogance and inflexibility as a leader). While Brazil is no 
longer under military rule, Brazil must take greater strides to be-
come a true democratic nation. And unlike the United States, the 
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Brazilian citizenry simply do not follow and respect the Constitu-
tion—it is not viewed as the all-mighty, even holy document as the 
United States Constitution is viewed. The same deference is not 
given to authority or to the law in Brazil, making it tremendously 
difficult for rules to be followed and making corruption a common 
occurrence. Unlike the United States Constitution which has had 
only 27 amendments in 230 years, Brazil’s current Constitution has 
had 102 amendments in 29 years, leaving Brazilians with a sense of 
aloofness over their own nation’s Constitution. 
While the 1988 Constitution was an important shift in the direc-
tion towards democracy, there is still substantial work that must be 
done. Brazil’s government must rid itself of corruption and no 
longer involve itself in scandals such as Operation Car Wash.  Brazil 
must create greater checks and balances on the executive branch and 
allow the judiciary and legislature to fulfill their responsibilities in 
accordance with the Constitution. Brazil must consolidate its count-
less political parties, thereby eliminating the common act of politi-
cians accepting bribes to forms majorities. Until Brazil takes the 
necessary steps towards democracy, impeachment will continue to 
be a common tool used against the executive. Thus, it is likely that 
more impeachments in Brazil will continue to occur as the Brazilian 
citizenry will stay ever vigilant and hold political rulers accountable 
for any actions that they find to be a misstep for the once flourishing 
nation. 
 
